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THE JUDICIAL SAFEGUARDS OF FEDERALISM
Neal Devins·

I.

INTRODUCTION

There is no federalism constituency within Congress. Not only do federal lawmakers and national lobbyists gladly sacrifice federalism in order to
advance other interests, but state officials also "have systematic political interests that often cause them to undermine federalism." 1 In explaining why
both state and federal officials discount federalism, John McGinnis and Ilya
Sornin's Federalism vs. States' Rights: A Defense of Judicial Review in a
Federal System provides an important and persuasive critique of the claim
that the national political process inevitably protects federalism. 2
My comments will extend Federalism v. States Rights in two ways.
First, I will posit an alternative explanation as to why the national political
process does not value structural federalism. In particular, I will argue that
even if the American people were well informed about the benefits of federalism, they would still trade off those benefits in order to secure other policy objectives. For this reason, I think McGinnis and Somin are wrong in
suggesting that informed voters would likely value federalism over other
objectives and, consequently, that the problem with the political process policing federalism is that Americans are "know nothings" who have little incentive to learn about, let alone "monitor[,] the federal state balance."3 As I
will argue in Section II of this Comment, there is no reason to believe that
the problem with federalism is that the principals (the American voters)
lack the impetus to check their agents (state and federal officials). The
problem is more pervasive: No one really cares about federalism. 4
Goodrich Professor of Law and Professor of Government, College of William and Mary. Thanks
to John McGinnis for asking me to comment on his and Ilya Somin's paper and to John and Ilya for
writing such an important, engaging paper. Thanks also to Jim Gardner and Alan Meese for helpful discussions about the issues examined in this Comment.
1 John 0. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States' Rights: A Defense ofJudicial Review in a
Federal System, Nw. U. L. REv. 103 (2004).
2 For a collection of leading articles both advancing and critiquing this "political safeguards" claim,
see id. at I 03--04.
3
!d. at ms. 95, 100--01.
4 In arguing that voters, interest groups, and elected officials care more about underlying policy issues than federalism, I do not mean to cast doubt on the public policy benefits of federalism. After all,
federalism may be a bit like Iiver-good for you, but something that very few people would choose. For
additional discussion, see McGinnis & Somin, supra note I, at 106-112 (discussing public policy bene-
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Second, by looking at congressional responses to the Rehnquist
Court's federalism revival, I will argue that the Court could successfully
pursue a more ambitious theory of structural federalism. In short, because
interest groups, voters, and elected officials care more about underlying policy issues than about structural protections, there is no federalism constituency to block the Rehnquist Court's reinvigoration of federalism. This
conclusion is in tension with McGinnis and Sornin's contention that federal
and state officials strongly support deferential judicial review of federalism
issues and, as such, might resist additional judicial tightening of Congress's
powers.
II. FEDERALISM AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS
Americans have low levels of political knowledge and almost no
knowledge of the division of power between federal and state govemments.5 Extrapolating from social science research on political knowledge,
McGinnis and Sornin offer a common sense explanation for voter ignorance
on federalism: Unlike issues such as gun control, same sex marriage, and
the death penalty, federalism is "too abstract and complicated to engage the
passion of citizens."6 What, then, of Americans who are well-informed
about the federal-state balance, including the benefits of federalism outlined
in Federalism vs. States' Rights? Would they trade off federalism for other
objectives?
The answer to this question is important. One premise of the principalagent theory that animates McGinnis and Somin's analysis is that informed
Americans would not sacrifice structural federalism. Otherwise, there
would be no need for judicial enforcement of federalism to protect the interests of voter/principals. Voter/principals, instead, would simply be part
of a governmental system that regularly discounts federalism. Under this
scenario, the Supreme Court might still protect federalism. But the rationale for such protection would not be moored to principal-agent theory. The
justification for judicial protection of federalism, instead, would be tied to
judicial efforts to advance the public interest or the Court's belief that the
text and original meaning of the Constitution mandate judicial enforcement
of federalism. 7

fits of federalism); Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1194-1200 (2001) (explaining how judicial enforcement of federalism helps ensure that legislation serves the public good, not simply private interests).
5 McGinnis & Somin, supra note I, at 95-96 (citing social science research).
6 !d. at 96.
7 McGinnis and Somin view their principal-agent argument as a "supplement to analyses of text and
original meaning." McGinnis & Somin, supra note I, at 92. They also back public interest justifications for judicial enforcement of federalism, noting that "the goals of state and federal officials are not
always congruent with the public interest." /d. at 91. For an article of mine advancing a public interest
justification for judicial enforcement of federalism, see Devins, supra note 4, at 1194-1200.
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McGinnis and Somin, to their credit, call attention to some of the reasons that informed voters might subordinate federalism to substantive policy objectives. They note that our "mass culture has largely extirpated state
differences" and that "sentiments that may have previously motivated citizens to take an interest and protect federalism have faded. " 8 They also recognize that citizens are more interested in policy issues like civil liberties
than they are in "reviving the original constitutional structure."9 For the
most part, however, McGinnis and Somin link this discounting of federalism to voter ignorance about federalism and its benefits. Indeed, consistent
with the principal-agent theory that grounds their argument, they suggest
that informed voters might not subordinate federalism.
McGinnis and Somin offer no direct proof for this proposition. Rather,
they simply note that "even ... those who would prefer a consistent respect
for federalism to their particular first order substantive policies" might nevertheless discount federalism because "they have no assurance that their political opponents will similarly respect federalism." 10 I have no doubt that
this claim is correct. At the same time, this claim speaks only to "those
who would prefer a consistent respect for federalism." The more important
question is whether a credible commitment to federalism would prompt
most informed voters to place federalism ahead of their preferred substantive policies. That question is never considered by McGinnis and Somin.
Moreover, their conclusion seems contrary to the historical record and in
tension with their claim that citizens "lack the attachments to their states
that may have motivated them to pay attention to issues of federal structure
in the past." 11
Voters, even those who understand and value federalism, may nevertheless have strong overriding preferences about one or more substantive issues. Single issue voters are a classic and extreme example of this
phenomenon. These voters are willing to subordinate secondary preferences (including federalism) in order to secure their first order preferences
(typically the environment, civil rights, gun control, or abortion). Consider,
for example, abortion rights. Pro-life voters embrace the pro-life agenda
sometimes by supporting and other times by opposing measures that rely on
an expansive view of congressional power. Partial birth abortion bans are
approved and freedom of choice legislation resisted--even though both
measures rely on broad understandings of congressional power. Likewise,
pro-choice voters embrace the pro-choice agenda, opposing partial birth
bans and supporting freedom of choice legislation. These voters, in other
words, are "willing to contemplate the exercise of power by either level of
8 McGinnis & Somin, supra note I, at 96.
9 /d. at 97.

10 /d. at 100.
11 /d. at 96; see also supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text (discussing why McGinnis and Somin
think that voters might discount structural federalism).
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government, depending upon which level can more persuasively demonstrate that it can do the better job." 12
Single issue voters are certainly the exception, not the rule. But the
willingness of lawmakers and interest groups to manipulate federalism in
order to secure preferred substantive policies is the rule. Indeed, the historical record is so overwhelming that it is hard to believe that a majority of
informed voters would suspend their personal policy preferences in order to
reap the benefits of structural federalism.
The propensity of the American people to pay more attention to desired
results than to which level of government is acting on their behalf dates
back to the Framers. Writing in the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton
claimed that if either the state or federal government "invaded" their rights,
citizens "can make use of the other, as the instrument of redress." 13 Under
this view, the state and federal government would compete with each other,
and the people would decide which level of government would predominate. Accordingly, during the early Republic, the "rule of thumb seemed to
be, when one's rivals or enemies were in control of the central government,
one was prone to savor states' rights, but when one's own faction was in
control, the doctrine lost its zest." 14
Consider, for example, the Louisiana Purchase. 15 Northern Federalists,
proponents of centralized federal power, and Jeffersonians, who consistently advocated in favor of states' rights, flipped their normal positions
when fighting over the Purchase. Northerners feared that the Purchase
would shift power to the South and the West and, accordingly, embraced
states' rights. Jeffersonians, in contrast, thought it more important to complete the Purchase than to run the risk of waiting for a constitutional amendment that would incorporate the Purchase into the Union.
This pattern of shifting constitutional positions on federalism runs
through American history. Rather than adhere to a consistent position on
federalism, Americans have always let their views on first order policy priorities dictate their views on federalism. Before the Civil War, abolitionists
opposed federal fugitive slave laws on states' rights grounds (while proslavery forces embraced this exercise of federal power). 16 After the start of
the Civil War, however, abolitionists embraced nationalistic solutions and
12
James A. Gardner, State Constitutional Rights as Resistance to National Power: Toward a Functional Theory of State Constitutions, 91 GEO. L.J. 1003, 1010 (2003).
13 THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 179 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). For additional relevant quotes from the Federalist Papers, see Gardner, supra note 12, at I 088-89.
14
FORREST MCDONALD, STATES' RIGHTS AND THE UNION 48 (2000). For examples of this practice during the early Republic, see id. at 27-70.
15
This paragraph is based on Forrest McDonald's account of the Louisiana Purchase. See id. at
58---{)2.
16

See id. at 158---{)J; Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Tragic Irony of American Federalism: National
Sovereignty Versus State Sovereignty in Slavery and in Freedom, 45 U. KAN. L. REv. 1015, 1025
(1997).
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pro-slavery forces espoused states' rights arguments. Likewise, before
workers could turn to the federal government during the New Deal, tum-ofthe-century progressives "strove to curb the power of entrenched corporate
wealth" (and federal government support for big business) by embracing
states' rights. 17 Today, progressives invoke federalism in order to secure
gains made in the federal courts, opposing nationwide bans on partial birth
abortion and same sex marriage as an improper intrusion on state prerogatives.18 When pursuing judicial invalidations of state abortion laws and
state restrictions on gay rights, however, progressives embraced national
standards.
For their part, elected officials ostensibly committed to federalism have
proven quite willing to sacrifice this commitment in order to secure desired
policy goals. Consider, for example, the Reagan administration. On the one
hand, the administration strongly backed federalism-issuing an executive
order on federalism, pushing for state control of federal grants, and asking
the Supreme Court to return power to states on abortion, school desegregation, and prayer. 19 Despite this commitment to federalism, the administration was willing to intervene at the state and local level to advance its own
agenda. In the Baby Doe Case, the administration unsuccessfully argued
that federal standards, not state and local ones, ought to govern medical decisions involving infants born with severe handicaps. 20 The administration's enforcement of its federalism executive order was also sporadic;
sometimes the administration seemed willing to back business interests at
the expense of the executive order. Former Assistant Attorney General
Douglas Kiniec provides a revealing account of one of these episodes. 21 In
response to a California initiative requiring warning labels on products containing carcinogens, business lobbyists successfully pushed the administration to conclude-contrary to the executive order-that federal law
preempted this state initiative. Although the preemption regulation never
took effect (because of the handover of power from the Reagan administration to the Bush administration), Kmiec's account highlights why it is that
presidents are unlikely to value federalism ahead of other policy priorities. 22
17 Eugene D. Genovese, Getting States' Rights Right, ATL. MONTHLY, March 2001, at 82.
18 Simon Lazarus, Next on Abortion: Supreme Collision, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2003, at B-4 (partial birth abortion); Wayne Woodlief, Divisive Issue Groomed to Kerry's Edge, BOSTON HERALD, Apr.
I, 2004, at 39 (same sex marriage).
19 See NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 68-69, 134-35, 202--04
(2004) (discussing, in order, executive orders, abortion, and school prayer).
20 Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610 (1986).
21 DOUGLAS W. KMIEC, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S LAWYER: INSIDE THE MEESE JUSTICE
DEPARTMENT 143-49 (1992).
22 For a related argument involving the separation of powers, see Nelson Lund, Lawyers and the
Defense of the Presidency, 1995 BYU L. REv. 17 (1995) (arguing that the pursuit of preferred policy
objectives makes it impossible for presidents to consistently enforce a unitary vision of the separation of
powers).
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The Reagan administration's practices are hardly unusual. George W.
Bush's administration's support for national standards on same sex marriage, physician-assisted suicide, and partial birth abortion are recent examples of this phenomenon. 23
Likewise, notwithstanding the fact that
Republicans took over Congress in 1994 by running on the anti-big government "Contract with America," Republican lawmakers strongly backed
national standards on tort reform, telecommunications reform, and numerous criminal law initiatives. 24
The willingness of Republican lawmakers and the Reagan and Bush
administrations to subordinate federalism, in part, is tied to their respective
beliefs that the nationalist measures they support are politically popular.
Consider, for example, Congress's enactment of sex offender notification
laws as well as legislation prohibiting carjacking and gun possession near
schools. Lawmakers backed these laws because they would bolster their
position with voters.Z 5 In other words, the failure of the political process to
police federalism is not simply about the incentives of states, interest
groups, and federal officials inside the Washington, D.C. beltway. 26 The
problem is also tied to the fact that self-interested voters are able "to move
freely from one level of government to another in an attempt to find the
level at which they might try most advantageously to get what they want." 27
Unless these voters perceive that the benefits of federalism outweigh their
first order substantive policies, they will trade off federalism (even if they
think that there is a credible commitment to enforce it).
For this very reason, there is no federalism constituency pushing lawmakers to embrace a broad or narrow view of federal power. 28 Voters, in23 McGinnis and Somin point to these three episodes as instances where the "subordination of federalism to other goals" might not take place if there was "a credible commitment to enforcing federalism." McGinnis & Somin, supra note I, at 99. For reasons detailed in this section, I think that informed
voters might well trade off federalism even ifthere was a credible commitment to enforce it.
24 See Forgotten Federalism, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 7, 1995, at 16 (tort reform and criminal law);
Saundra Torry, Tort and Retort: The Battle over Reform Heats up, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 1995, at F7
(tort reform); Edmund L. Andrews, Overhaul Backed in Communication, N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 21, 1995, at
AI (telecommunications reform).
25 See Keith E. Whittington, Taking What They Give Us: Explaining the Court's Federalism Offensive, 51 DUKE L.J. 477, 512-15 (200 I) (explaining lawmaker support for so-called position-taking legislation, that is, legislation that is enacted because it allows lawmakers to make pleasing statements to
voters); William Marshall, American Political Culture and the Failures of Process Federalism, 22
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 139, 145 (1998) (discussing congressional support for Megan's Law and carjacking legislation).
26
Federalism vs. States' Rights, supra note I, does a wonderful job of illustrating those incentives.
I too discuss those incentives, focusing on the problem of interest group-driven legislation, in Devins,
supra note 4, at 1194-1200.
27 E. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE 10-11 (1960).
28
See Whittington, supra note 25, at 509-18; Neal Devins, The Federalism-Rights Nexus: Explaining Why Senate Democrats Tolerate Rehnquist Court Decision Making But Not the Rehnquist Court, 73
U. COLO. L. REV. 1307, 1318-24 (2002). For additional discussion, see infra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
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terest groups, and political parties look to democratic outlets to pursue favored policy initiatives. Unless judicial interpretations foreclose the pursuit
of first order policy priorities, it is unlikely that lawmakers will formally
and consistently embrace a broad theory of federalism. Likewise, unless
their substantive policy agenda is threatened, presidents will not use their
bully pulpit, veto power, or control over federal agencies to advance a coherent vision of federalism.
To summarize: The political process will not police structural federalism. Elected officials invoke federalism when it comports with their substantive policy preferences, but they otherwise do not care about the
federal-state balance. 29 Interest groups and voters will pursue favored policy objectives at whatever level of government will embrace their agenda.
In other words, the problem with federalism is far more pervasive than the
principal-agent problem identified by McGinnis and Somin. Beyond
"know nothing" voters who have little reason to learn about the workings of
government, federalism is destined to be a second order concern. Informed
voters might well subordinate federalism in order to pursue favored policies--even if they knew that federalism would be consistently enforced.
More telling, those who have incentive to understand the workings of our
system of government and manipulate that system for their advantage (interest groups and politicians) nonetheless have little stake in federalism.
By providing additional support for McGinnis and Somin' s claim that
the political process does not value federalism, the above discussion makes
clear that the policing of federalism can only take place in the courts. And
while I agree with McGinnis and Somin that neither states nor voters are
likely to check federal officials on federalism-related issues, I think their
principal-agent theory is off the mark. Federalism's second class status is
now and has forever been a byproduct of the fact that both voter/principals
and elected officials/agents place immediate first order policy priorities
ahead of a coherent vision of governmental power. The question remains:
How should the courts police federalism? That is the subject of the next
Section.
III. JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERALISM: LESSONS FROM THE
REHNQUIST COURT

Assuming that federalism is undervalued in the political process, 30 how
should the Supreme Court protect federalism? In addressing this issue, I
29 In addition to examples discussed in the text, opponents of school desegregation have long employed the banner of "states' rights" in framing their opposition to Supreme Court rulings. Prominent
examples include the "Southern Manifesto" in which Southern congressmen expressed their disapproval
of Brown and Richard Nixon's efforts to appeal to Southern voters by attacking Court decisions limiting
local control of school systems. For a recent and worthwhile history, see MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM
JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS : THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004).
3 For some, the fact that federalism is not especially salient in the political process means that the

°
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will focus on a very practical question: How far can the Supreme Court go
in preserving the federal-state balance?
Lacking the powers of purse and sword, the Supreme Court must make
sure that its decisions are acceptable to the American people and their
elected officials. 31 Otherwise, the Court risks a political backlash-one that
will almost certainly undo any doctrinal innovations that it might pursue. 32
With respect to federalism, can the Court advance an expansive theory
without risking political reprisals?
For Justices interested in expanding judicial protections of federalism,
Federalism vs. States' Rights sounds a cautionary note. Although supporting judicial enforcement of federalism, McGinnis and Somin's principalagent analysis also calls attention to how it is that elected officials have
strong incentive to embrace a system of government that discounts federalism.33
Furthermore, by highlighting why elected officials have reason to learn
the "rules of the game" governing the division of power among federal and
state governments, 34 McGinnis and Somin indicate that increased judicial
protections of federalism might well provoke a political backlash. Elected
officials will have cause to countermand the Court while voter/principals
are unlikely to pay any attention to the Court, and as such, the Court will
not pressure elected officials to respect the Court's invigoration of federalism.35
On the other hand, if the focus of Congress, the states, interest groups,
and informed voters is the underlying policy issue, the Court may have substantial leeway on federalism questions. Specifically, if federalism is of little salience to all affected parties, there is less of a commitment to
policing of federalism is neither essential to our constitutional system nor a necessary check on private
interests who seek legislation that benefits themselves at the expense of the public. In this Comment, I
do not tackle the larger question of whether the policing of federalism is good public policy. My concern is limited to the related issues of why the political process does not value federalism and what that
means for courts who are interested in policing federalism. In other writings, I have argued that the policing of federalism serves the public interest. See Devins, supra note 4, at 1194-1200.
31 See Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 VA. L. REv. 83,
90 (1998).
32
Social scientists have long argued that political pressures will force the Court to comport with
policy views dominant among the American people and their elected representatives. For classic treatments of this subject, see Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a
National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 ( 1957); Richard Funston, The Supreme Court and Critical Elections, 69 AM . POL. Scr. REV. 795 (1975). For more recent studies, see Devins & Fisher, supra note 31;
LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998). In citing these studies, I am not
making the broader claim that the Court takes social and political forces into account when deciding
cases. My claim is simply that the Court's constitutional decisions " are never for long out of line with
the policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the United States." Dahl, supra, at 285.
33 McGinnis & Somin, supra note I, at 118-19.
34
!d. at 97.
35 On why voter/principals will not pressure elected officials, see id. at ms. 94-100.
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preserving lawmaker prerogatives. The key question, instead, is whether
there is a satisfactory democratic outlet in which interest groups, lawmakers, and the American people can pursue desired policies. Indeed, absent
something as stark as the Lochner era (where Supreme Court hostility to
New Deal economic policies undermined first order policy preferences)/ 6
there is little reason to expect voters, interest groups, or political parties to
pressure elected officials to take federalism seriously.
For reasons detailed in Section II, I think federalism is a low salience
issue. In this section, I will both test this conclusion and explore its ramifications to Court-Congress relations. By examining Congress's response to
Rehnquist Court federalism rulings, this Section will explain why the Court
can ratchet up its policing of substantive federalism without fear of a political backlash. In so doing, this section will call into question McGinnis and
Somin's claims about lawmaker incentives. Rather than push the Supreme
Court to embrace doctrines that regularly maximize their authority, lawmakers are interested in their substantive policy agenda and little else.
Sometimes that means working around decisions that invalidate favored
programs. In particular, rather than challenge restrictive federalism decisions, lawmakers will instead seek alternative ways of pursuing the policy
initiatives they support. Moreover, when lawmakers disapprove of the invalidated law, they are likely to support the Court's decision (since their focus is the case's outcome, not the Court's reasoning). By highlighting the
lack of lawmaker interest in the Rehnquist Court's federalism revival, this
section provides concrete evidence to support Section II claims about the
willingness of both lawmaker/agents and informed voter/principals to subordinate federalism in order to pursue favored policies.
From 1995 to 2002, the Rehnquist Court invalidated all or parts of
thirty-one federal statutes. Along the way, it revived federalism-limiting
the scope of Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment and expanding the scope of state protections under the
Tenth and Eleventh Amendments. 37 For its part, Congress is accepting of
these decisions. 38 Rather than castigate the Court for limiting its power,
Congress has largely ignored these decisions. With the exception of deci36 See ROBERT MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 106-13 (2d ed. 1994); Keith E.
Whittington, Dismantling the Modern State? The Changing Structural Foundations of Federalism, 25
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 483,525-27 (1998). For a thoughtful argument that many of the laws invalidated (while perhaps popular with Congress) were unpopular with the American people, see Barry
Cushman, Mr. Dooley and Mr. Gallup: Public Opinion and Constitutional Change in the 1930s, 50
BUFF. L. REv. 7 (2002).
37 For an excellent oveJView of how this 1995 to 2002 revival of federalism represented a clear
break from past Court practices, see Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A
Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569, 576-90 (2003).
38 Several of the examples contained in this paragraph and the paragraph which follows it are drawn
from Devins, supra note 28, at 1309-24 and Neal Devins, Congress as Culprit: How Lawmakers
Spu"ed on the Court's Anti-Congress Crusade, 52 DUKE L.J. 435, 449-52 (2001). More detailed presentations of the points made in these paragraphs can be found in those articles.
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sions invalidating the Gun Free School Zone Act and Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, lawmakers hardly ever commented on the precedential impact of any of the Court's federalism decisions. 39 When lawmakers have
rewritten laws struck down by these federalism rulings, they have accepted
the Court's decision as final, limiting their revisions to those which the
Court is likely to approve.4° Correspondingly, today's lawmakers seem
quite approving of the Court's power to invalidate federal statutes. A recent
opinion poll of members of the 106th Congress (1999-2001) reveals that
71% of lawmakers adhere to a 'joint constitutionalist" perspective whereby
courts should give either "limited" or "no weight" to congressional assessments of the constitutionality of Iegislation.41
Another measure of congressional acquiescence to Rehnquist Court
federalism rulings is the limited relevance of these rulings to legislative
hearings. Confirmation hearings of George W. Bush judicial nominees
have virtually ignored federalism. The focus, instead, remains on abortion
and civil rights. 42 Nor have federalism rulings prompted congressional
committees into action. Rather than hold a raft of hearings evaluating the
ramifications of the federalism revival, these rulings did not affect the number of congressional hearings held on constitutional questions. 43
To explain this phenomenon, it may be that lawmakers are comfortable
with judicial efforts to cabin their authority. Today's lawmakers often embrace calls to devolve power to the states and otherwise limit the power of
the federal govemment. 44 Another explanation for lawmaker acquiescence
is that these decisions do not foreclose democratic outlets. Unlike decisions
on abortion, school prayer, school desegregation, and the free speech rights
39 See Neal Devins, supra note 28, at 1311-12 (2002) (noting that a June 24, 2002 LEXIS database
search of the Congressional Record uncovered ten references to the precedential impact of the Court's
decision invalidating the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, sixteen references to the decision invalidating the Gun Free School Zone Act, and no more than four lawmaker comments about the precedential impact of any other decision imposing federalism-based limits on congressional power).
40 See id. at 1313-14 (noting examples).
41
Bruce G. Peabody, Congressional Attitudes Towards Constitution Interpretation , in CONGRESS
AND THE CONSTITUTION (Neal Devins & Keith E. Whittington eds., forthcoming 2005). See also Bruce
G. Peabody, Congressional Constitutional Interpretation and the Courts: A Preliminary Inquiry into
Legislative Attitudes, 1959-2001,29 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 127, 145-48 (2004). In sharp contrast, 44%
of 1960 lawmakers signaled their disapproval of the Warren Court by asserting that the Supreme Court
should give a "great deal of weight" or "controlling weight" to congressional interpretations of the Constitution. DoNALD G. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF RESPONSIBILITY
372-73 (1966).
42
See Devins, supra note 28, at 1328.
43
Keith E. Whittington, Hearings About the Constitution, in CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 41 .
44 This, of course, was the centerpiece of the " Contract with America" that House Republicans ran
on in 1994 (the year that Republicans took over both Houses of Congress). More generally, Congress
has responded to increasing skepticism about the trustworthiness of the federal government by embracing power sharing arrangements that empower states and localities. See Christopher H. Schroeder,
Causes of the Recent Turn in Constitutional Interpretation, 51 DUKE L.J. 307,346-59 (2001).

140
HeinOnline -- 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 140 2004-2005

99:131 (2004)

The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism

of communists, lawmakers who lose before the Supreme Court can still
pursue their favored agenda without calling for the overruling of Court decisions.
Consider, for example, abortion. Following Roe, pro-life lawmakers
could not regulate abortion in the first trimester (let alone outlaw it) without
calling for Roe's reversal. In contrast, federalism rulings allow Congress to
pursue the same substantive agenda either by making use of another source
of federal power and/or pursuing a scaled down version of the invalidated
statute. 45 Indeed, Congress responded to Court rulings invalidating the Gun
Free School Zone Act and Religious Freedom Restoration Act by enacting
less sweeping versions of the legislation invalidated by the Court. 46
Perhaps more telling, the interest groups which lobby Congress have
little reason to push for a fundamental rethinking of Court federalism rulings. Interest groups, for reasons detailed in Section II, care about advancing their policy agenda and little else. Sometimes that policy agenda is
consistent with a broad view of federal power (when Congress enacts and a
court validates a law that advances that agenda). On other occasions, an interest group's agenda is consistent with a narrow view of congressional
power (when a court invalidates a law that advances competing interests). 47
Unless and until court federalism rulings stand as a significant roadblock to the pursuit of favored policies, interest groups will not organize
around federalism. Instead, interest groups will simply pursue their agenda
in the forum most likely to validate their efforts. When the Court strikes
down a federal program on federalism grounds, interest groups may pursue
state reforms and/or federal reforms that do not run afoul of the Court's rulings.48
The question remains: How far can the Court go without prompting a
political backlash? No doubt, the Court can go further than it has gone.
Unlike McGinnis and Sornin's claims about lawmaker incentives, this Section has shown that neither elected officials nor national interests are
strongly committed to the Court's crafting federalism doctrine that allows
45 Some commentators have suggested that Court federalism decisions do not foreclose more comprehensive federal legislation, so long as it is packaged to avoid the problems identified by the Court.
See Adrian Yermeule, Does Commerce Clause Review Have Perverse Effects?, 46 VILL. L. REv. 1325,
133(}--33 (2001); T.R. Goldman, Lawmakers Take Steps to Respond After Legislation Is Found Unconstitutional, LEGAL TIMES, July 14, 1997, at 8. For additional discussion, see infra notes 5(}--52.
46 See Devins, supra note 28, at 1313-14.
47
See supra text accompanying notes 11-12 (discussing why it is that neither pro-choice nor prolife voters have reason to support an expansive or narrow view of congressional power).
48
Federal reforms, as noted above, were pursued in cases involving the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and Gun Free School Zone Act. State reforms were pursued following the Court's invalidation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and Americans with Disabilities Act. See Helen Irvin,
Several States Respond to Garrett Decision, Consider Waiving Immunity to ADA Lawsuits, 70 U.S. L.
WK. 2003 (2001); Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Mode/for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REv.
1465, 1473-75 (1999).
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Congress to define the scope of its expansionist tendencies. In particular,
Congress is accepting of the Court's federalism revival; correspondingly,
interest groups have little incentive to pressure lawmakers to limit the
Court. With that said, there are limits to how far the Court can or should
go. In the paragraphs that follow, I will sketch some of these limits and offer a suggestion for how the Court might pursue a more ambitious federalism revival. 49
To start by way of a summary: The Rehnquist Court's federalism revival failed to provoke the ire of lawmakers, interest groups, or the American people for three distinct reasons. First, unlike rights-based decision
making, federalism rulings rarely foreclose democratic outlets. Second (and
correspondingly), the Rehnquist Court's federalism revival has not prevented elected officials or interest groups from pursuing their policy
agenda. The Court, while limiting Congress's power, has not sought areturn of Lochner era restrictions. 50 Indeed, notwithstanding its numerous innovations, the Court is yet to limit Congress's spending power. 5 1 Moreover,
while limiting Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court has signaled that Congress may make aggressive use of this power to
protect the interests of women and racial minorities. 52 Third, the placing of
some limits on Congress reflects populist and lawmaker distrust of the federal government. During the 1990s, candidates successfully campaigned
against the inside-the-beltway political establishment. Bill Clinton ran for
president as a "New Democrat"; Republicans gained control of Congress by
running on the "Contract with America." 53
In sharp contrast, Lochner era federalism rulings prompted a political
backlash because they significantly limited the dominant political coalition's first order policy priorities. 54 For today's Supreme Court to prompt a
similar response, the Court would need to do two things. It would have to
invalidate legislation that powerful interest groups and lawmakers care passionately about. It would also have to limit Congress's powers in ways that
49 As I write these words, I recognize that the 2004 presidential elections (and the Supreme Court
appointments that will follow them) will almost certainly define the fate of the Rehnquist Court's federalism revival.
50 See supra note 45; see also Ramesh Ponnuru, The Court 's Faux Federalism, in A YEAR AT THE
SUPREME COURT 131 (Neal Devins & Davison Douglas eds., forthcoming 2004).
51 On May 17, 2004, for example, a unanimous Supreme Court yet again validated Congress's
Spending Clause power in Sabri v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 1941 (2004). Upholding a law that makes it
illegal to bribe officials at state or local agencies that receive federal funds, the Court rejected the claim
that the Spending Clause demands that there be some connection between the bribe and the federal
grant. Concluding that Congress employed "rational means" to safeguard federal funds, the Court upheld Congress's power to fight corruption at agencies receiving federal funds . !d. at 1946.
52 Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
53 For a detailed presentation of how social and political forces contributed to anti-Congress rulings
by the Rehnquist Court, see NEAL DEVINS, THE MAJORJTARIAN REHNQUIST COURT, LAW &
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS (forthcoming 2004).
54 See Whittington, supra note 25, at 509-10.
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prevent interest groups and lawmakers from pursuing first order policy priorities. For example, a political backlash would almost certainly follow the
overturning of commerce clause decisions approving public accommodations legislation and/or the rejection of nondiscrimination requirements
grounded in the Spending Clause. Likewise, the overturning of the Clean
Air Act would come at a great political cost.
On the other hand, a modest tightening of the Commerce or Spending
Clauses would not prompt political retaliation. When enforcing the Spending Clause, courts could take a harder look at whether the conditions Congress imposes on the recipients of federal funds are reasonably related to the
purposes for which the funds are expended. 55 Also, by paying closer attention to whether an economic activity, in fact, has a substantial impact on interstate commerce, the Court could more aggressively police federalism. 56
That the Supreme Court can go further than it has does not prove that
increased judicial enforcement of federalism serves the public interest.
McGinnis and Sornin advance several arguments suggesting that federalism
benefits the public. 57 In sorting out whether those arguments are correct, the
Court might want to make use of a common law approach-incrementally
tightening its federalism doctrine while observing both the political response and possible public policy benefits.
The Rehnquist Court, as it turns out, has done just that. Its initial rulings were tentative. After observing that Congress and the American people were comfortable with those rulings, the Court expanded the scope of its
federalism revival. 58 For reasons discussed in this Section, I think that the
Court can continue to employ this formula with success.
IV. CONCLUSION
By providing an alternative explanation as to why the political process
does not value federalism, this Comment has sought to strengthen the cen55 This is precisely what Justice O'Connor called for in her dissenting opinion in South Dakota v.
Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). Specifically, Justice O'Connor thought that Congress went too far when it
conditioned federal highway funds on state action prohibiting liquor sales to those under twenty-one. In
particular, O'Connor thought the law impermissibly burdened teenagers who were not about to drive on
the interstate (especially since the law did not limit the rights of adults, even those who drove on the interstate). ld. at 214-15 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
56 By way of analogy, it appears that the Lochner era Congress was prepared to accommodate the
Court this way. See Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional
Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 695, 711-12 (discussing Congress's
willingness to engage in "sustained and increasingly thoughtful" fact finding to supports its invocations
of the commerce clause). The Rehnquist Court has yet to impose similar demands on Congress, although a 2004-2005 Term case squarely addresses this issue. See David G. Savage, Medical Marijuana
to Get Justices' Review, L.A. TIMES, June 29, 2004, at A.20 (noting that the Court will determine
whether Congress's commerce power extends to regulating homegrown marijuana).
57 See McGinnis & Somin, supra note I, at 106-112.
58 See Devins, supra note 38, at 462--63.
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tral conclusion of Federalism vs. States Rights. Specifically, if the federalstate balance is to be policed, the courts must do that policing. In part,
problems of voter asymmetry explain why voter/principals will not police
federalism. Likewise, for reasons expertly detailed by McGinnis and
Somin, state and federal officials often disregard federalism when pursuing
first order policy priorities. But the problem is even deeper than McGinnis
and Somin suggest. Informed voters are also likely to trade off federalism
in order to advance favored policies. As detailed in Section II, Americans
have always paid attention to their substantive policy preferences, not federalism. Moreover, as Section III explains, federalism rulings rarely foreclose democratic outlets. As such, these rulings do not figure in voter
efforts to pressure lawmakers to pursue favored policies. Against this
backdrop, the problem with federalism seems far more pervasive than the
principal-agent theory advanced by McGinnis and Somin. In justifying
their theory, McGinnis and Somin must do more than speculate that informed voters would place federalism first if they thought that federalism
limits would be enforced across-the-board. Instead, they must come forward with evidence supporting their claims about the true preferences of
voter/principals.
Correspondingly, McGinnis and Somin go too far in suggesting that
lawmakers and national lobbies are strongly committed to deferential judicial review of federalism. No doubt, as McGinnis and Somin explain,
elected officials and national lobbies have strong incentives to understand
the rule of the game. On the other hand, for reasons detailed in Section III,
lawmakers and national interests have little sense of stake in federalism.
Sometimes, the pursuit of their favored policies requires the sacrificing of
federalism; other times, they see judicial enforcement of federalism as a
way to limit the victories of their political opponents. Ironically, the very
reasons that explain why the political process is unlikely to police federalism makes possible active judicial review of federalism. Because voters,
interest groups, and lawmakers care more about underlying policy objectives than federalism, the court can enforce federalism limits so long as
there is a democratic outlet available for lawmakers, voters, and interest
groups to pursue their favored policies.
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